


April 9, 2007

Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein Federal Communications Commission 445 12<sup>th</sup> Street SW, Room 8-A302 Washington, DC 20554

Re:

U.S. Cellular Corp. CC Docket No. 96–45 WC Docket No. 05-337 WT Docket 06-150 John E. Rooney
President & CEO



Dear Commissioner Adelstein:

Thank you for being **so** generous with your time at the CTIA conference in Orlando. I appreciated hearing your point of view on universal service and the upcoming 700 MHz auction, **As** we discussed, I have enclosed a summary of our company's position on these subjects.

As we move toward universal service reform and an auction of spectrum capable of offering true broadband services to rural America, I ask you to keep rural consumers at the forefront of your thinking. Urban consumers have numerous choices in services and service providers today, and will continue to have such choices into the future.

That is not the case in our nation's rural areas. Many small towns have been left out of the wireless revolution because no company's business plan supports the construction of the networks needed to enable consumers to use a mobile phone everywhere they live and work. You can be certain that if it were profitable to do **so**, it would have happened in the nearly twenty years since the Commission first issued cellular licenses in rural America.

For companies like ours, which have significant interest in appropriately serving rural areas, universal service support is absolutely critical to delivering highquality services to high-cost areas that would not otherwise support stand-alone investments. With support, we are today building new cell sites in many small rural communities that deserve to have advanced telecommunications services. Universal service support enables **us** to offer dependable service throughout the rural communities we serve.

In 2007, the public safety benefits of mobile wireless service scarcely bear mention. Rural consumers have a right to highquality networks that enable them to place emergency and important telephone calls in times of need. Whether it be floods in Missouri, wind storms in Washington, or ice storms in Maine, our networks are the carrier of only resort in an emergency. We survive extreme conditions and we are the first to return to service. A mobile phone is now a critical public safety tool for consumers – but it is useless in areas where networks are underdeveloped, Neither 911 nor E-911 service have meaning unless the call goes through.

On a worldwide basis, wireless is now in the forefront of voice communications. The question is how long it will take to develop in America's rural areas. In every state where we have been designated an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier (ETC), we are aggressively investing all available support to enhance our service, and customers are experiencing a tremendous improvement in our coverage. At a time when competitive carriers like ours have relatively young networks, it is puzzling to me why the Commission would seriously consider impeding our development by capping support. We urge the Commission to reject that proposal.

No. of Copies rec'd 0 42 List A B C D E Finally, we ask the Commission to **grant** our **pending petitions for ETC status at the** earliest possible date. Consumers in western North Carolina, southwestern Virginia, and rural New Hampshire who pay into the fund have been waiting roughly three years for **us** to accelerate our network construction and deliver new services. ETC status will make this a reality.

In closing, I am hopeful that we can continue to provide you with information as you work through these issues. If you have any follow up questions on these subjects, please contact me directly. Again, it was a pleasure having the opportunity to discuss these important matters, and your time was greatly appreciated.

Sincerely

**Enclosure** 

cc: Barry Ohlson, Esq.

Scott Bergman, Esq.



## **Universal Service Distribution Caps and Reverse Auctions**

## **Distribution Caps**

U.S. Cellular opposes a cap that applies solely to competitive ETCs ("CETCs").

- A CETC-only cap contravenes the FCC's own core principle of competitive neutrality. The
  first Report and Order adopted competitive neutrality as a core principle. No class of
  carrier or technology may be advantaged or disadvantaged by the rules.
- Rural ILECs have lost 10% of their access lines over the past three years, and the trend is accelerating. As a result, ILEC support **per-line** is rising.
- A CETC-only cap will **reduce** per-line support to CETCs, who are investing in new networks and increasing customers.
- Capping support to growing networks will impede rural infrastructure development that
  provides critical public safety and economic development benefits to consumers. For
  example, U.S. Cellular has applications pending in Missouri and Illinoisfor large areas that
  have no CETCs designated. In each case, U.S. Cellular has committed to invest roughly
  \$10 million per year to construct new networks covering thousands of square miles in rural
  areas.
- If there must be a cap, then a competitively neutral version, similar to that proposed by
  Joint Board member Billy Jack Gregg is preferable. All carriers would be capped and
  support would be adjusted to carriers based on market penetration. A cap which requires
  all carriers to share in the solution is not only competitively neutral, but it is also a move
  toward portability which is required by the statute. See, Alenco, et al. v. FCC, 201 F.3d
  608 (5" Cir. 2000).
- It is not competitively neutral to place caps only on CETCs, stating that the caps apply to both wireless and wireline competitors.

# Short-Term Actions Needed to Control Fund Growth

- Instead of caps, the Commission should reform universal service in line with its long series
  of orders:
  - Disaggregation: Mandate disaggregation of Rural ILEC service areas to, at a minimum, the wire center level. ILECs must accurately target support to areas that are 'high-cost" for their networks. All available evidence indicates that there will be significant program savings.
  - Portability: Support must be made "fully portable." Rural ILECs cannot continue
    to receive \$3 billion per year for voice networks that consumers are rapidly
    abandoning. Support must be used to ensure that rural consumers have access
    to the voice services they are choosing. For CETCs, when you get a customer
    you get support and when you lose a customer you lose support that's how it
    should work for all carriers.
  - Efficiency: Support must not exceed the actual cost of building an efficient voice network. The current "modified embedded cost" mechanism is "the more you spend, the more you get" for rural LECs. This breeds inefficiency and increases funding needs.

## **Lona Term Reform Measures**

- Any reforms of universal service must provide for a competitively neutral distribution of funds that allow rural customers access to services comparable to those available in urban areas. Reverse auctions that result in a single "winner" will perpetuate monopoly or duopoly status in rural areas and impede development of new more economically efficient technologies.
- A reverse auction cannot be conducted in a competitively neutral fashion until competitive networks are constructed. That is, even a more efficient newcomer cannot rationally bid against an entrenched carrier until its network is similarly mature.
- Auctions which award a "franchise" to any one technology by definition locks out new, more efficient technologies attempting to enter after an award is made.
- Limiting ETC status to one ILEC and one competitor per market would not result in significant program savings. There is no wireline competition in all but 90 of the 1400 rural ILEC study areas, which means over 90% of rural ILECs would not be subject to auctions. As for CETCs, the current "per-line" mechanism effectively caps support because support among CETCs is fully portable.

#### Upper and Lower 700 MHz Auction

# **Balanced Consensus Plan**

- The present 700 MHz band plan devotes too much spectrum to very large EAG licenses. Although this band is particularly well-suited for rural use, smaller and rural-focused providers cannot afford to compete with industry giants for these super-regional, EAG-sized licenses. Unless the FCC reconfigures the 700 MHz band plan, small and regional wireless carriers will be foreclosed from bidding on the remaining available licenses and from competing for customers in the marketplace. Alternative providers increase the number of choices available to consumers in all markets, especially during this period of industry consolidation.
- Such a change would be consistent with the FCC's recognition of the need to make affordable spectrum blocks available to carriers serving rural markets, including regional carriers, small wireless providers, and new entrants.
- The 700 MHz band plan should be reconfigured to afford bidding opportunities to regional and smaller providers on multiple spectrum blocks and with a variety of geographic license areas to allow providers with a variety of business plans to aggregate spectrum from adjacent blocks and to acquire overlapping or adjacent service areas to meet their coverage needs.
- Auctioning licenses for smaller service areas is also a valuable proposition for the U.S.
   Treasury because a mix of smaller and larger service area sizes has been shown to
   enhance competition among bidders. While several different factors go into the
   valuation process, an analysis of prior auctions demonstrates that smaller license areas
   earn high bids and, in the aggregate, increase total auction proceeds.

#### Packane Bidding Issues

- U.S. Cellular opposes use of a package auction format, which would allow the largest bidders to distort the appropriate balance of small and large licenses under the Balanced Consensus Plan.
- Bidders for individual licenses will face either (a) the risk of reactivation of their dormant, but potentially winning bids, as a result of activity on other licenses in a package, or (b) a new "coordination" problem resulting from the need to simultaneously submit prospectively-losing bids on parts of a package. The stakes are simply too high to use package bidding for the 700 MHz auction.

## Anonymous Bidding Issues

 U.S. Cellular supports use of transparent bidding with traditional information disclosures in the auction of Upper and Lower 700 MHz bands. Blind bidding would compound the risk that already attends development of a new band. "Strategic dependency" on large carriers (roaming, infrastructure, devices, making a market for 3G/4G applications) means that large carrier bids provide essential real-time valuation information for small bidders. Blind bidding potentially complicates the financing of small bidders, who already face a short timeframe to prepare for the auction.

#### Performance, Negotiation and Renewal Reauirement issues. E911 and HAC Issues:

U.S. Cellular supports extending E911 and HAC obligations to licensees in the band.
However, the FCC should not alter existing Part 27 performance requirements and
renewal standards. U.S. Cellular supports continued use of "substantial service"
performance requirements or, alternatively, the adoption of safe harbors such as those
proposed by Verizon Wireless in its January 31,2007 ex parte submission in WT Docket
No. 06-150.

#### **Guard Band Interference Issues:**

 US. Cellular also supports possible reconfiguration of 700 MHz Guard Band spectrum to meet the twin goals of protecting Public Safety and of not adversely impairing use of the commercial bands to be auctioned.

#### Frontline Proposal:

U.S. Cellular opposes adoption of the Frontline's proposed service rules (1) because its proposed nationwide license would all but eliminate competitive bidding for this spectrum and disrupt flexible bidding and aggregation opportunities under the Balanced Consensus Plan for others in the auction, (2) because the adoption of service rules which would restrict spectrum use to Frontline's unique business plan violate longstanding Commission policies supporting competitive neutrality and flexible uses in those rules, and (3) because the administratively sound way to achieve the benefits in other substantive areas of Frontline's proposals is to address them in rulemaking proceedings, in the case of roaming, for example, in the Commission's longstanding automatic roaming proceedings in WT Docket Nos. 05-265 and 00-193.